Congress should support the Trump administration`s trade agreement with Japan, but also continue negotiations for a new comprehensive free trade agreement. With respect to other tariffs, in negotiations on the agreement, there was talk of a promise by the Trump administration not to use Section 232 to impose additional tariffs on imports of Japanese cars/auto parts, which the government is currently considering for several countries. But I do not see such a promise in the texts published yesterday. The practical answer might be that if the Trump administration imposes these tariffs on auto parts, Japan simply withdraws from the agreement under Article 10 (“Any contracting party can denounce this agreement by announcing a written denunciation to the other party. The information will come into effect four months after the date on which one party has sent this written notification to the other party or on another day when the parties can decide. The U.S. nomenclature of the agreement is listed in Schedule II, “Tariffs and Tariff-Related Provisions of the United States.” Commercial data comes from the U.S. Census Bureau through the Global Trade Atlas IHS Markit. U.S. tariff lines are eight-digit classifications in the U.S.
Harmonized Tariff Plan (HTSUS). The full U.S. tariff plan and U.S.-MFN rates for 2019 can be accessed at dataweb.usitc.gov/tariff/annual. Congress sets targets for U.S. trade negotiations and sets certain authorities to reach agreements to achieve progress in Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation under the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act 2015 (P.L. 114-26); TPA-2015.29 TPA expedites the review of the terms and conditions for the adoption of trade agreements on tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, provided the administration meets certain notification and consultation requirements. It also gives the President, section 103 (a) (19 U.C No. 4202(a)) the authority to announce limited tariff reductions without further action by Congress.30 The Authority`s Restrictions under Section 103 (a) relate primarily to the level and implementation of the reduction in tariffs (i.e. “U.S. Tariff and Quota Commitments”). The two agreements, included in the Level 1 trade agreement between the United States and Japan, deal with commitments on tariffs and quotas for industrial and agricultural products, as well as obligations in the field of digital trade. Limited coverage and composition represent a significant departure from the most recent U.S.
trade agreements, which are generally comprehensive and cover other issues such as customs procedures, public procurement procedures, labour and environmental protection, intellectual property rights (IPRs), services and investments.34 And fourth, it appears to be a bilateral agreement to reduce tariffs, but without all the usual aspects of chapter governance, such as a chapter on dispute resolution. With regard to disputes, it seems that there is only: in the TPA, the main objective of WTO trade, “it is a matter of ensuring that regional trade agreements in which the United States does not participate fully meet the high standards of WTO disciplines, including Article XXIV of GATT 1994, Articles V and V until the General Agreement on Trade in Services , “In addition, the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, S.L. 114-27, orders the administration that “if other countries attempt to negotiate trade agreements that do not essentially cover all trade, they continue to issue objections in all appropriate forums.” See, for example, Testimony of Robert Lighthizer, Senate Finance Committee, The President`s 2019 Trade Policy Agenda hearing, 116th Congress, 2nds., June 18, 2019, on www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/the-presidents-2019-trade-policy-agenda-and-the-united-states-mexico-canada-agreement.